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One of the main issues in modern network science is the phenomenon of cas-
cading failures of a small number of attacks. Here we define the dimension
of a network to be the maximal number of functions or features of nodes of
the network. It was shown that there exist linear networks which are prov-
ably secure, where a network is linear, if it has dimension one, that the high
dimensions of networks are the mechanisms of overlapping communities, that
overlapping communities are obstacles for network security, and that there
exists an algorithm to reduce high dimensional networks to low dimensional
ones which simultaneously preserves all the network properties and signifi-
cantly amplifies security of networks. Our results explore that dimension is
a fundamental measure of networks, that there exist linear networks which
are provably secure, that high dimensional networks are insecure, and that
security of networks can be amplified by reducing dimensions.
Network security has become a grand challenge in the current science and technology. We
proposed a new model of high dimensional networks by natural mechanisms of homophyly,
randomness and preferential attachment. We found that low dimensional networks are much
more secure than that of the high dimensional networks, and that there exists an algorithm to
1
reduce dimensions of networks which preserves network properties and significantly amplifies
security of the networks. Our model provides a foundation for both theoretical and practical
analyses of security of networks, and an approach to amplifying security of networks.
Networks are proven universal topology of complex systems in nature, society and indus-
try (1). One of the main issues of modern network theory is that most networks are vulnerable
to a small number of attacks. This poses a fundamental issue of security of networks (2).
The first type of security is the connectivity security against physical attacks of removal of
nodes. For this, it has been shown that in scale-free networks of the preferential attachment
(PA, for short) model (3), the overall network connectivity measured by the sizes of the giant
connected components and the diameters does not change significantly under random removal
of a small fraction of nodes, but the overall connectivity of the networks are vulnerable to
removal of a small fraction of the high degree nodes (4–6).
The second type of security is the spreading security against cascading failures by a small
number of attacks. We notice that cascading failures naturally occur in rumor spreading, disease
spreading, voting, and advertising etc (7–9). It has been shown that in scale-free networks of
the preferential attachment model even weakly virulent virus can spread (10).
The authors have shown that cascading failures of attacks are much more serious than that of
the physical attacks of removal of nodes, that neither randomness in the ER model (11, 12) nor
the preferential attachment scheme in the PA model (3) is a mechanism of security of networks,
and that homophyly and randomness together resist cascading failures of networks ( A. Li, W.
Zhang, Y. Pan and X. Li, Homophyly and randomness resist cascading failure in networks).
This shows that some community structures play an essential role in network security.
In practice, overlapping communities are omnipresent. This poses a new question: What
roles do the overlapping communities play in network security?
In this article, we found that overlapping communities are obstacles for security of networks.
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To solve this problem, we propose an algorithm to amplify security of a network by reducing
the dimension of the network. The algorithm removes the obstacle of overlapping communities
in network security.
Results
Let G = (V, E) be a network. Suppose that each node v ∈ V has a threshold φv. Let S ⊂ V
be a subset of vertices of G. We define the infection set of S in G recursively as follows: 1)
initially we say that every node in S is infected, 2) a node v ∈ V becomes infected, if φv fraction
of v’s neighbors are already infected. We use infG(S ) to denote the set of all nodes infected by
S in G.
Security Model
We propose a new model of networks, the security model. It proceeds as follows: Given a
homophyly exponent a and a natural number d,
(1) Let Gd be an initial d-regular graph such that each node has a distinct color and called
seed.
For each step i > d, let Gi−1 be the graph constructed at the end of step i − 1, and pi =
1/(log i)a.
(2) At step i, we create a new node, v say.
(3) With probability pi, v chooses a new color, in which case,
(a) we call v a seed,
(b) (Preferential attachment) create an edge (v, u) where u is chosen with probability
proportional to the degrees of nodes in Gi−1, and
(c) (Randomness) create d − 1 edges (v, u j), where each u j is chosen randomly and
uniformly among all seed nodes in Gi−1.
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(4) Otherwise, then v chooses an old color, in which case,
(a) (Randomness) v chooses uniformly and randomly an old color as its own color, and
(b) (Homophyly and preferential attachment) create d edges (v, u j), where u j is chosen
with probability proportional to the degrees of all nodes of the same color as v in
Gi−1.
We denote the security model by S. Let G = (V, E) be a network of model S. Since every
node v ∈ V has only one color, we define the dimension of G to be 1. In so doing, we call G a
linear network.
It has been shown that: for sufficiently large n, if G is a network of the security model with
n nodes, then almost surely (or with probability 1−o(1)), the following properties hold: (Proofs
of the results are referred to A. Li, Y. Pan and W. Zhang, Provable security of networks).
1) (Power law) G follows a power law.
2) (Small world property) The diameter of G is O(log n).
3) (Homophyly) Let X be a homochromatic set of nodes. Then:
(a) The induced subgraph GX of X in G is connected,
(b) The diameter of GX is bounded by (log log n),
(c) GX follows a power law with the same power exponent as that of G,
(d) The degrees of nodes in X follow a power law of the same exponent as that of G,
(e) The size of X is |X| = O(loga+1 n), and
(f) The conductance of X in G is Φ(X) = O( 1
|X|β ) for some constant β, where |X| is the
size of X.
4
4) (Uniform security) There exists an φ = o(1) such that for threshold φv = φ for all nodes v
in G, for any set S of nodes of size within a polynomial of log n, the size of the infection
set of S in G is o(n).
5) (Random security) For every node v in G, if v defines its threshold randomly and uni-
formly, i.e., φv = r/dv, where dv is the degree of v, and r is randomly and uniformly
chosen from {1, 2, · · · , dv}, then for any set S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n,
the size of the infection set of S in G is o(n).
1) - 3) demonstrate that networks of the security model have all the useful properties of
networks. 4) - 5) show that the networks of model S are provably secure against cascading
failures of attacks.
The proofs of 4) and 5) involved new probabilistic and combinatorial principles, for which
we outline the ideas.
Let G = (V, E) be a network constructed from S. For a node v ∈ V , we define the length
of degrees of v to be the number of colors associated with all the neighbors of v, written by
l(v). For a j, we define the j-th degree of v to be the size of the j-th largest homochromatic set
among all the neighbors of v. We use d j(v) to denote the j-th degree of v. Then with probability
1 − o(1), we have the following degree priority principle:
(i) The length of degrees of v is bounded by O(log n),
(ii) The first degree of v, d1(v) is the number of neighbors that share the same color as v,
(iii) The second degree of v is bounded by a constant O(1), and
(iv) If v is a seed node, then the first degree of v is lower bounded by, or at least, Ω(log a+14 n).
A community is a homochromatic set X of V , or the induced subgraph of a homochromatic
set X. We say that a community X is strong, if the seed node x0 of X cannot be infected even if
all its neighbors with colors different from that of x0 are all infected, unless there are non-seed
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nodes in X which have already been infected. Otherwise, we say that the community X is vul-
nerable. For appropriately chosen homophyly exponent a, the properties (i) - (iv) above ensure
that almost all communities of G are strong. Therefore, the number of vulnerable communities
is negligible.
Let us consider the infection among strong communities. Suppose that X, Y and Z are strong
communities with seeds x0, y0 and z0 respectively. It is possible that x0 infects a non-seed node
y1 ∈ Y , y1 infects the seed node y0 ∈ Y , and y0 infects a non-seed node z1 ∈ Z. In this case, the
infection of the seed x0 of X generates a sequence of strong communities Y , Z and so on such
that each of the communities contains infected nodes. However by the construction of G, we
have that x0 is created later than y1, that y0 is created later than z1, and that the edges (x0, y1),
(y0, z1) are created by the preferential attachment scheme at the time step at which a seed node is
created so that the edges are embedded in a tree T . We call the tree T the infection priority tree
of G. The key point is that the infection priority tree T satisfies the following basic principle:
With probability 1− o(1), T has height bounded by O(log n). We call this property the infection
priority tree principle.
Therefore the infection of a seed node x0 generates a path of at most O(log n) many strong
communities each of which contains infected nodes. In addition, each community has size
bounded by O(loga+1 n). So even if all the nodes of an infected community are infected, the
contribution to the infection set is still negligible.
For any attack S of size bounded by a polynomial of log n, let k be the number of vulnerable
communities. Then there are at most |S |+ k many seed nodes each of which generates a path of
infected strong communities. This allows us to prove that the size of the infection set of S in G
is o(n), negligible comparing to n.
The arguments above show that the small community phenomenon of G is one of the ingre-
dients in the proofs of security of G. We emphasize that the connecting patterns of the small
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communities are crucial to the proofs of the security of G. In particular, the degree priority
principle ensures that almost all communities are strong, and the infection priority tree princi-
ple ensures that any path of infected strong communities has length O(log n).
Therefore linear networks from model S are provably secure. In the proofs of the security
result, the community structures play an essential role in security of networks. However it is
not the case that every network with a community structure is more secure.
2-Dimensional Security Model
We generalize the security model to 2 dimensions such that the networks are rich in overlap-
ping communities. The 2-dimensional security model proceeds as follows: Given a homophyly
exponent a and a natural number d,
(1) Let Gd be an initial d-regular graph such that each node has a distinct color and called
seed.
For each i > d, let Gi−1 be the graph constructed at the end of step i−1, and pi = 1/(log i)a.
(2) At step i, we create a new node, v say.
(3) With probability pi, v chooses a new color, in which case,
(a) we call v a seed,
(b) randomly and uniformly chooses an old color, c say, as the second color of v,
(c) (preferential attachment) create an edge (v, u) where u is chosen with probability
proportional to the degrees of nodes in Gi−1,
(d) for each j = 1, 2, · · · , d − 1:
- (randomness) with probability 12 , randomly and uniformly chooses a seed node u j,
in which case, create an edge (v, u j),
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- (homophyly) otherwise, then chooses a node u j with probability proportional to
the degrees of nodes among all nodes sharing the second color c of v, and create an
edge (v, u j).
(4) Otherwise, then v chooses an old color, in which case,
(a) (randomness) v chooses uniformly and randomly an old color as its own color, and
(b) (homophyly and preferential attachment) create d edges (v, u j), where u j is chosen
with probability proportional to the degrees of all nodes of the same color as v in
Gi−1.
We use S2 to denote the 2-dimensional security model. Let G = (V, E) be a network con-
structed by S2. We define a community of G is the induced subgraph of a homochromatic set,
X say. In this case, a seed node, v say, may have two colors c1 and c2, so that v is contained in
two communities GX and GY say. Therefore, G has an overlapping community structure.
Here we interpret the maximal number of colors (or features) of nodes for all the nodes of
the network is the dimension of the network. It is easy to extend the model to k-dimensional
model for arbitrarily given natural number k. We have argue that networks of the security model
S are secure. A natural question is: Are networks of model S2 secure?
In Figures 1 and 2, we depict the security curves against a small number of attacks of the top
degrees of networks G1’s from the security model S, of networks G2 from the 2-dimensional
security model S2. In both figures, G1 and G2 have homophyly exponent a = 1.5, and number
of nodes n = 10, 000. The networks G1 and G2 in Figures 1 and 2 have average numbers of
edges d = 5, and 10 respectively.
From Figures 1 and 2, we have that networks of the security model are much more secure
than that of the 2-dimensional security model. Therefore low dimensional networks are more
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secure than that of the high dimensional networks. This experiment shows that dimension is an
important measure of networks which plays an essential role in security of networks.
Algorithm R: Reducing Dimensions of Networks
We know that high dimensional networks are less secure than that of low dimensional ones.
Can we amplify security of networks by reducing dimensions? For this, we introduce an algo-
rithm to reduce high dimensional networks to low dimensional ones.
Let G = (V, E) be a network. Suppose that X = {X1, X2, · · · , Xl} is an overlapping com-
munity structure of G. We introduce a graph reduction algorithm to remove the overlapping
communities of G as follows.
(1) Let X = ∪X j.
(2) For every x ∈ X, we split x by the following steps:
(a) suppose that Y1, Y2, · · · , Yk are all communities X j’s containing x,
(b) For each i = 1, 2, · · · , k, let di(x) be the number of neighbors of x that are in Yi,
(c) Replace x by a circle of k nodes x1, x2, · · · , xk.
(d) For each i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}, all the neighbors of x that are in Yi link to xi.
(e) For every neighbor z of x which is outside of Yi for all i, with probability proportional
to di(x), we replace the edge (z, x) by (z, xi).
We use R to denote the reduction above. Clearly, R splits the overlapping communities of
G into disjoint communities.
R Preserves Network Properties
In Figure 3, we depict the degree distributions of a network G1 from the security model S,
a network G2 from the 2-dimensional security model S2 and the network H reduced from G2
9
by R, i.e., H = R(G2), where the homophyly exponent a = 1.5, the average number of edges
d = 10 and the number of nodes n = 10, 000 in the construction of G1 and G2. From the figure,
we know that G1, G2 and H = R(G) all follow a power law of the same power exponent.
In Table 1, we report the diameters, average distances and clustering coefficients of a net-
work G1 from the security model S, a network G2 from the 2-dimensional security model S2,
and the reduced network H = R(G2), where the homophyly exponent a = 1.5, average number
of edges d = 10, and n = 10, 000 for both G1 and G2.
From Table 1, we have the following properties:
1. The diameter and average number of distances of G1 are approximately equal to that of
G2 respectively.
2. The diameter and average number of distances of H = R(G2) are slightly larger than that
of G2 respectively.
3. The clustering coefficient of G1 is significantly larger than that of G2.
Therefore high dimensional networks have less clustering coefficients than that of the low
dimensional ones.
4. The clustering coefficient of H = R(G2) is approximately equal to that of G2.
We thus have that high dimensions significantly reduce the clustering coefficients, and that
high dimensions undermine security of networks. However the high dimensions preserve both
the power law and the small world property of low dimensional networks. For the reduction R,
we have:
1) It reduces dimensions of networks,
2) It preserves the clustering coefficients of networks,
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3) It preserves the power law and small world property, and
4) It slightly increases the diameters and average numbers of distances of networks.
4) is the only disadvantage of R, for which we know that the amount of increments of
diameters and average numbers of distances are small, compared to that of the origin networks.
R Amplifies Security of Networks
In Figures 1 and 2, we depict the security curves against a small number of attacks of the top
degrees of networks G1’s from the security model S, of networks G2 from the 2-dimensional
security model S2, and the reduced networks from G2’s by R, i.e., the networks H = R(G2). In
both figures, G1 and G2 have homophyly exponent a = 1.5, and number of nodes n = 10, 000.
The networks G1 and G2 in Figures 1 and 2 have average numbers of edges d = 5, and 10
respectively.
From Figures 1 and 2, we have the following results:
1. For a network G from model S2, H = R(G) is much more secure than G.
2. For the same homophyly exponent a, average number of edges d and number of nodes
n, let G1 and G2 be the networks constructed from models S and S2 respectively. Then
H = R(G2) has approximately the same security as that of G1.
These results demonstrate that algorithm R optimally amplifies the security of networks of
model S2 so that it significantly amplifies security of networks against cascading failures of
attacks. We notice that the only cost of R is that it slightly increases the diameters and average
numbers of distances of networks.
Method Summary
For the cascading failure of attacks, for a network G = (V, E), every node v ∈ V picks
randomly and uniformly a threshold φv = r/dv, where r is randomly and uniformly chosen
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from {1, 2, · · · , dv}, and dv is the degree of v in G. The curves of cascading failures of all the
experiments in Figures 1 and 2 are the maximal ones among 100 times of attacks of the top
degree nodes.
Discussion
Global cascading failure may occur in many networks by a small number of attacks for
which there are various reasons. Clearly the 2-dimensional model can be easily extended to
higher dimensional ones. However the 1- and 2-dimensional models are already sufficient for us
to investigate the roles of high dimensions in structure and security of networks. We found that
high dimensions are the mechanisms of overlapping communities in networks, that high dimen-
sions and their structural characteristics of overlapping communities are fundamental reasons of
insecurity of networks against cascading failures of attacks, and that there exists an algorithm
to amplify security of networks by reducing the dimensions. Furthermore, our algorithm for
reducing dimensions preserve all the network properties of the original networks. The new con-
cepts and discoveries reported here include: 1) dimension is a fundamental notion of networks,
2) there exist linear networks which are provably secure, 3) high dimensions reduce clustering
coefficients and undermine security of networks, 4) security of networks can be amplified by
reducing dimensions, and 5) algorithms for reducing dimensions preserve all the properties of
the original networks. These discoveries may not only point out new directions of network the-
ory, but also have implications and potentials in understanding and analyzing complex systems
in general.
References and Notes
1. Baraba´si, A. Scale-free networks: a decade and beyond. Science 325, 412–413 (2009).
2. Schweitzer, F., Fagiolo, G., Sornette, D., Vega-Redondo, F., Vespignani, A. & White, D. R.
12
Economic networks: The new challenge Science 3255, 422–425 (2009).
3. Baraba´si, A. & Albert, R. Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 509–512
(1999).
4. Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Baraba´si, A. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
Nature 406, 378–381 (2000).
5. Cohen, R., Erez, K., Ben-Avraham, D. & Havlin, S. Resilience of the internet to random
breakdowns. Physical Review Letters 85, 4626–4628 (2000).
6. Motter, A. E. Cascade control and defense in complex networks. Physical Review Letters
93, 098701 (2004).
7. Watta, D. J. A simple model of global cascades on random networks. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 99, 5766–5771 (2002).
8. Andersen, R. M. & May, R. M. Infectious diseases of humans: Dynamics and control.
(Oxford University Press, 1991).
9. Morris, S. Contagion. Review of Economic Studies 67, 57–78 (2000).
10. Pastor-Satorras, R., Va´zquez, A., & Vespignani, A. Dynamical and correlation properties
of the internet. Physical Review Letters 87, 258701 (2001).
11. Erdo¨s, P. & Re´nyi, A. On random graphs, i. Publ. Math. 6, 290–297 (1959).
12. Erdo¨s, P. & Re´nyi, A. On the evolution of random graphs, i. Magyar Tud. Akad. Mat.
Kutato´ Int. Ko´zl. 5, 17–61 (1960).
13
log(n) 3log(n) 5log(n) 7log(n) 9log(n)
Initial size
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
In
fe
ct
io
n
 r
a
ti
o
cascading curves (N=10000, a=1.5, d=5)
G1
G2
H=R(G2 )
Figure 1: Security curves. We use G1 and G2 to denote the networks constructed from models
S and S2 respectively. Let H = R(G2). In the construction of G1 and G2, a = 1.5, d = 5 and
n = 10, 000. The horizon represents the number of attacked top degree nodes, and the vertical
line is the number of the largest infected sets among 100 times of attacks. The security of G1,
G2 and H = R(G2) are colored blue, green and red respectively. In each time of attacks, the
threshold of a node is randomly defined.
G1 G2 H = R(G2)
Diameter 10 9 12
Average Distance 5.68 5.19 6.33
Clustering Coefficient 0.535 0.359 0.352
Table 1: Network Properties. Diameters, average distances and clustering coefficients of G1, G2
and H = R(G2), where G1 and G2 are constructed from the models S and S2 respectively, with
a = 1.5, d = 10 and n = 10, 000.
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Figure 2: Security curves. The same as Figure 1, the difference is that in G1 and G2, d = 10.
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Figure 3: Degree distributions of a network G1 from S and a network G2 from S2 and the
reduced version of G2 by R, that is, H = R(G2), where the homophyly exponent a = 1.5,
average number of edges d = 10, and number of nodes n = 10, 000 in the construction of G1
and G2. The distributions of G1, G2 and H are colored red, green and blue respectively. From
the figure, we know that G1, G2 and H all follow a power law of the same power exponent.
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